Source: JPMorgan Economic Research There is a reason the ECB is going all out to provide funding with unprecedented terms/amounts to the banking system – they are trying to arrest these tightening lending conditions. The liquidity should help, but the damage has already been done to the Eurozone’s corporations and consequently to jobs and the area’s economic growth.
via pragcap.com
Posted at 11:26 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Domestic-credit booms and real currency appreciation are the most robust and significant predictors of future crises, in both advanced and emerging economies.5 For the latter group of countries, higher international reserves are also associated with a lower probability of subsequent crises. Finally, we find that public debt plays a role in the case of banking crises.
via www.voxeu.org
Posted at 12:51 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Now the capitalist system has been corrupted. The managerial state has assumed responsibility for looking after everything from the incomes of the middle class to the profitability of large corporations to industrial advancement. This system, however, is not capitalism, but rather an economic order that harks back to Bismarck in the late nineteenth century and Mussolini in the twentieth: corporatism.
In various ways, corporatism chokes off the dynamism that makes for engaging work, faster economic growth, and greater opportunity and inclusiveness. It maintains lethargic, wasteful, unproductive, and well-connected firms at the expense of dynamic newcomers and outsiders, and favors declared goals such as industrialization, economic development, and national greatness over individuals’ economic freedom and responsibility. Today, airlines, auto manufacturers, agricultural companies, media, investment banks, hedge funds, and much more has at some point been deemed too important to weather the free market on its own, receiving a helping hand from government in the name of the “public good.”
The costs of corporatism are visible all around us: dysfunctional corporations that survive despite their gross inability to serve their customers; sclerotic economies with slow output growth, a dearth of engaging work, scant opportunities for young people; governments bankrupted by their efforts to palliate these problems; and increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of those connected enough to be on the right side of the corporatist deal.
This shift of power from owners and innovators to state officials is the antithesis of capitalism. Yet this system’s apologists and beneficiaries have the temerity to blame all these failures on “reckless capitalism” and “lack of regulation,” which they argue necessitates more oversight and regulation, which in reality means more corporatism and state favoritism.
It seems unlikely that so disastrous a system is sustainable. The corporatist model makes no sense to younger generations who grew up using the Internet, the world’s freest market for goods and ideas. The success and failure of firms on the Internet is the best advertisement for the free market: social networking Web sites, for example, rise and fall almost instantaneously, depending on how well they serve their customers.
Posted at 12:48 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
La deuda pública es grande o pequeña en relación a la capacidad de pagarla. Se ha puesto de moda poner la deuda en relación al PIB. El PIB es la cantidad de euros que se consiguen generar en España en un año (euros/año) mientras que la deuda está en unidades de euros por lo que la Deuda/PIB está en unidades de años. Es decir, Deuda/PIB es la cantidad de años que se tardaría en pagar toda la deuda si el gobierno español dedicara TODO EL DINERO QUE GANAN TODOS LOS ESPAÑOLES a pagar la deuda. 70% quiere decir que si el gobierno fuera capaz de usurpar todo el dinero que ganan todos los españoles, tardaría el 70% de un año en pagar sus deudas. Un dato totalmente no informativo dado que el gobierno español no puede utilizar el todo el dinero que ganan los españoles a pagar la deuda. El gobierno español puede utilizar el dinero que ingresa él. Del mismo modo, que la deuda pública sea mayoritariamente privada también es no informativo porque la mayoría del PIB también es del sector privado. La pregunta es, la deuda del estado español es alta o baja EN RELACIÓN A LA CAPACIDAD DEL ESTADO ESPAÑOL DE PODER PAGARLA. Y la capacidad de pagarla depende de los ingresos que tiene el estado y de los gastos que ya tiene comprometidos. Para poder pagar, pues, el estado debería ser capaz de generar más ingresos que gastos (es decir, debería tener superávits fiscales). Justo antes de empezar la crisis, España tenía leve superávit fiscal. Pero las cosas se complicaron en 2008-2009: la caída de la recaudación debido a la incompetencia del estado a la hora de recaudar lo que se debe, la subida de los subsidios de paro debido a la nefasta regulación laboral y las absurdas políticas keynesianas de estímulos fiscales llevadas a cabo por el gobierno de Zapatero (plan renove, plan E, cheques bebé, etc), conllevaron un déficit de cerca del 11% del PIB. Los enormes sacrificios en forma de recortes y subidas de impuestos solo han conseguido rebajar el déficit al 8% del PIB (el PSOE decía que lo habían rebajado al 6% pero eso ha resultado ser mentira). La nueva recesión en la que parece que entró España en el último trimestre de 2011 parece que no permitirá reducir el déficit el 4,4% como estaba proyectado. Es decir, España tiene serias dificultades para generar superávits y, por lo tanto, serias dificultades para poder pagar sus deudas. La deuda pública es, pues, demasiado alta en relación a la capacidad de pagar por mucho que se diga que el ratio deuda/PIB es menor que en Alemania o Estados Unidos.
Posted at 12:41 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Though it may be counterintuitive, rather than excusing misbehavior, opacity in finance implies that misbehavior of intermediaries must be policed more vigorously and punished more punitively than in a world that could be made transparent. If finance were as transparent as baseline neoclassical models suggest, there would have been no “flaw” in Alan Greenspan’s ideology, and no need to regulate markets or root out fraud. Creditors would themselves vet and monitor their financial arrangements, would assume risks in full knowledge of all potential mishaps ex ante, and could therefore be required to accept responsibility for losses ex post. There would be no need for any heavy-handed meddling by the state or vitriolic second-guessing by nasty bloggers. The harms of malinvestment would be internalized by investors who were capable of bearing the risks. When things go wrong, it would be none of the rest of our business.
It is when the relationship between capital provision and investment choice becomes intermediated and opaque that we must impose institutions of accountability. If we permit you to invest other people’s money behind closed doors, if, even worse, we institute society-wide cons (deposit insurance, rating agencies) to trick people into bearing the risk of your schemes, then it is absolutely essential that you perform your duties to a very high ethical standard, and that you have strong incentives to deploy the pilfered capital well rather than to squander or expropriate it.
Opacity creates a very serious technical problem: as we allow finance to be opaque and complex, it may become difficult to police and impose good incentives. So we may, as a society, face an unpleasant tradeoff. Tolerating more opacity may help mobilize capital for useful purposes, but any benefit may be offset by a diminishment of our capacity to regulate and police. At one extreme of opacity, financial intermediaries simply steal everybody else’s wealth. That’s no good. At the other extreme, if we insist on perfect transparency (without big changes in how we organize our affairs), the result will be extreme underinvestment. Which is no good either.
There are some issues that we’ll need to unpack. When we talk about “transparency”, a core question is transparent to whom? My thesis is that status quo finance must be opaque to beneficial investors, that is to the innumerable people who must be persuaded to bear some portion of the risk of aggregate investment when their informed preference would be to defensively hoard.
Posted at 11:58 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Attention is therefore shifting to the second narrative, which suggests that the advanced economies’ fundamental capacity to grow by making useful things has been declining for decades, a trend that was masked by debt-fueled spending. More such spending will not return these countries to a sustainable growth path. Instead, they must improve the environment for growth.
The second narrative starts with the 1950’s and 1960’s, an era of rapid growth in the West and Japan. Several factors, including post-war reconstruction, the resurgence of trade after the protectionist 1930’s, the introduction of new technologies in power, transport, and communications across countries, and expansion of educational attainment, underpinned the long boom. But, as Tyler Cowen has argued in his book The Great Stagnation, once these “low-hanging fruit” were plucked, it became much harder to propel growth from the 1970’s onward.
Meanwhile, as Wolfgang Streeck writes persuasively in New Left Review, democratic governments, facing what seemed, in the 1960’s, like an endless vista of innovation and growth, were quick to expand the welfare state. But, when growth faltered, this meant that government spending expanded, even as its resources shrank. For a while, central banks accommodated that spending. The resulting high inflation created widespread discontent, especially because little growth resulted. Faith in Keynesian stimulus diminished, though high inflation did reduce public-debt levels.
Central banks then began to focus on low and stable inflation as their primary objective, and became more independent from their political masters. But deficit spending by governments continued apace, and public debt as a share of GDP in industrial countries climbed steadily from the late 1970’s, this time without inflation to reduce its real value.
Recognizing the need to find new sources of growth, towards the end of Jimmy Carter’s presidency, and then under Ronald Reagan, the United States deregulated industry and the financial sector, as did Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. Productivity growth increased substantially in these countries over time, which persuaded Continental Europe to adopt reforms of its own, often pushed by the European Commission.
Yet even this growth was not enough, given previous governments’ generous promises of health care and pensions – promises made even less tenable by rising life expectancy and falling birth rates. Public debt continued to grow. And the incomes of the moderately educated middle class failed to benefit from deregulation-led growth (though it improved their lot as consumers).
The most recent phase of the advanced economies’ frenzied search for growth took different forms. In some countries, most notably the US, a private-sector credit boom created jobs in low-skilled industries like construction, and precipitated a consumption boom as people borrowed against overvalued houses. In other countries, like Greece, as well as under regional administrations in Italy and Spain, a government-led hiring spree created secure jobs for the moderately educated.
In this “fundamental” narrative, the advanced countries’ pre-crisis GDP was unsustainable, bolstered by borrowing and unproductive make-work jobs. More borrowed growth – the Keynesian formula – may create the illusion of normalcy, and may be useful in the immediate aftermath of a deep crisis to calm a panic, but it is no solution to a fundamental growth problem.
Posted at 11:53 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
FERGUSON: Well, you see the problem is that the logic of what she said was that she sees Europe becoming like the Federal Republic of Europe over the next 20 years. The European Commission will be the government, Parliament will be more powerful, the Council of Ministers will be like the second chamber. Fine. But the Federal Republic of Germany isn’t based on an austerity pact that requires countries never to run a budget deficit. It’s based on a transfer union. The money goes from the richer Bavarians to the poorer north Germans and, of course, to the East Germans. And it’s based on a central treasury with things called Bunds. Now, if you apply the analogy to the European level, it means there has to be a proper European treasury and European bonds. And that’s just what the Germans have been opposing. So the German position is inconsistent. They want a Federal Europe, that’s now clear. But they’re not prepared to will the means. And you cannot base fiscal federalism exclusively on a pact—a kind of pact of death that nobody ever runs a budget deficit.
Posted at 06:24 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
The diamond invention is far more than a monopoly for fixing diamond prices; it is a mechanism for converting tiny crystals of carbon into universally recognized tokens of wealth, power, and romance. To achieve this goal, De Beers had to control demand as well as supply. Both women and men had to be made to perceive diamonds not as marketable precious stones but as an inseparable part of courtship and married life. To stabilize the market, De Beers had to endow these stones with a sentiment that would inhibit the public from ever reselling them. The illusion had to be created that diamonds were forever -- "forever" in the sense that they should never be resold.
In September of 1938, Harry Oppenheimer, son of the founder of De Beers and then twenty-nine, traveled from Johannesburg to New York City, to meet with Gerold M. Lauck, the president of N. W. Ayer, a leading advertising agency in the United States. Lauck and N. W. Ayer had been recommended to Oppenheimer by the Morgan Bank, which had helped his father consolidate the De Beers financial empire. His bankers were concerned about the price of diamonds, which had declined worldwide.
In Europe, where diamond prices had collapsed during the Depression, there seemed little possibility of restoring public confidence in diamonds. In Germany, Austria, Italy, and Spain, the notion of giving a diamond ring to commemorate an engagement had never taken hold. In England and France, diamonds were still presumed to be jewels for aristocrats rather than the masses. Furthermore, Europe was on the verge of war, and there seemed little possibility of expanding diamond sales. This left the United States as the only real market for De Beers's diamonds. In fact, in 1938 some three quarters of all the cartel's diamonds were sold for engagement rings in the United States. Most of these stones, however, were smaller and of poorer quality than those bought in Europe, and had an average price of $80 apiece. Oppenheimer and the bankers believed that an advertising campaign could persuade Americans to buy more expensive diamonds.
Oppenheimer suggested to Lauck that his agency prepare a plan for creating a new image for diamonds among Americans. He assured Lauck that De Beers had not called on any other American advertising agency with this proposal, and that if the plan met with his father's approval, N. W. Ayer would be the exclusive agents for the placement of newspaper and radio advertisements in the United States. Oppenheimer agreed to underwrite the costs of the research necessary for developing the campaign. Lauck instantly accepted the offer.
In their subsequent investigation of the American diamond market, the staff of N. W. Ayer found that since the end of World War I, in 1919, the total amount of diamonds sold in America, measured in carats, had declined by 50 percent; at the same time, the quality of the diamonds, measured in dollar value, had declined by nearly 100 percent. An Ayer memo concluded that the depressed state of the market for diamonds was "the result of the economy, changes in social attitudes and the promotion of competitive luxuries."
Although it could do little about the state of the economy, N. W. Ayer suggested that through a well-orchestrated advertising and public-relations campaign it could have a significant impact on the "social attitudes of the public at large and thereby channel American spending toward larger and more expensive diamonds instead of "competitive luxuries." Specifically, the Ayer study stressed the need to strengthen the association in the public's mind of diamonds with romance. Since "young men buy over 90% of all engagement rings" it would be crucial to inculcate in them the idea that diamonds were a gift of love: the larger and finer the diamond, the greater the expression of love. Similarly, young women had to be encouraged to view diamonds as an integral part of any
Posted at 01:58 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Prosecutor Ruby Selva said: “Having befriended the victims she disguised herself as various 16-year-old boys for the sole purpose of having sexual relationships with them.”
Judge Peter Moss branded Barker, now 20, “mean and manipulative” and warned she could face jail. He said he could not be certain whether the cruel scam made her “bad and dangerous to know or mad and dangerous to know”.
Barker created bogus characters Aaron Lampard, Connor McCormack and Luke Jones on Facebook to lure her victims after they had told her about their “ideal” boyfriends.
After winning their confidence, she disguised herself as boys to meet them for kissing, cuddling and petting sessions at their homes.
The girls and their families knew Barker but did not suspect anything.
Ms Selva added: “Neither girl had any idea it was Miss Barker, their friend. If either of them had known of the deceit, that the boy they were having a relationship with was Miss Barker, they would not have consented to the acts.”
The prosecutor told the court that the older girl struck up a relationship with “Aaron Lampard” and the pair became an item before they even met.
She added: “She described meeting who she thought was Aaron in various parks, taking him home to her family.
“They too were taken in by the character, even though they had met Miss Barker. They described never really seeing Aaron Lampard’s face because of the hat being pulled down so low or him averting his eyes from them.”
via www.mirror.co.uk
Posted at 10:16 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
What is promised to us as the Road to Freedom is in fact the Highroad to Servitude. For it is not difficult to see what must be the consequences when democracy embarks upon a course of planning. The goal of the planning will be described by some such vague term as "the general welfare." There will be no real agreement as to the ends to be attained, and the effect of the people's agreeing that there must be central planning, without agreeing on the ends, will be rather as if a group of people were to commit themselves to take a journey together without agreeing where they want to go: with the result that they may all have to make a journey which most of them do not want at all.
Democratic assemblies cannot function as planning agencies. They cannot produce agreement on everything — the whole direction of the resources of the nation-for the number of possible courses of action will be legion. Even if a congress could, by proceeding step by step and compromising at each point, agree on some scheme, it would certainly in the end satisfy nobody.
To draw up an economic plan in this fashion is even less possible than, for instance, successfully to plan a military campaign by democratic procedure. As in strategy it would become inevitable to delegate the task to experts. And even if, by this expedient, a democracy should succeed in planning every sector of economic activity, it would still have to face the problem of integrating these separate plans into a unitary whole. There will be a stronger and stronger demand that some board or some single individual should be given power to act on their own responsibility. The cry for an economic dictator is a characteristic stage in the movement toward planning. Thus the legislative body will be reduced to choosing the persons who are to have practically absolute power. The whole system will tend toward that kind of dictatorship in which the head of the government is position by popular vote, but where he has all the powers at his command to make certain that the vote will go in the direction he desires.
Planning leads to dictatorship because dictatorship is the most effective instrument of coercion and, as such, essential if central planning on a large scale is to be possible. There is no justification for the widespread belief that, so long as power is conferred by democratic procedure, it cannot be arbitrary; it is not the source of power which prevents it from being arbitrary; to be free from dictatorial qualities, the power must also be limited. A true "dictatorship of the proletariat," even if democratic in form, if it undertook centrally to direct the economic system, would probably destroy personal freedom as completely as any autocracy has ever done.
Individual freedom cannot be reconciled with the supremacy of one single purpose to which the whole of society is permanently subordinated. To a limited extent we ourselves experience this fact in wartime, when subordination of almost everything to the immediate and pressing need is the price at which we preserve our freedom in the long run. The fashionable phrases about doing for the purposes of peace what we have learned.to do for the purposes of war are completely misleading, for it is sensible temporarily to sacrifice freedom in order to make it more secure in the future, but it is quite a different thing to sacrifice liberty permanently in the interests of a planned economy.
To those who have watched the transition from socialism to fascism at close quarters, the connection between the two systems is obvious. The realization of the socialist program means the destruction of freedom. Democratic socialism, the great utopia of the last few generations, is simply not achievable.
Posted at 10:10 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
