So, the only thing stopping Germany from announcing here and now a wholesale debt restructure is the banks. Thus my term the Great Banking Conundrum. The reason why banks are such a large problem is that they have their tentacles everywhere. Their profit is theirs to enjoy but their bankruptcy is everyone's loss. Unable to cash in their "assets" at a time of crisis, i.e. to retrieve their loans from their debtors (homeowners, businesses, governments), if they are forced to come clean regarding the true value of these assets, bank insolvency looms. So, Europe is not forcing serious stress tests upon them.
In other words, the reason the German government remains undecided on the Greek debt is that it is still struggling to compute the losses to German banks from a restructure of Greek, Irish, and Portuguese sovereign debt. There are two issues here: First, it is simply impossible to calculate the knock-on effects. For instance, while we know almost to the last euro the exposure of European banks to peripheral debt (here is a great interactive guide), it is impossible to predict precisely how, say, a 50% haircut of that debt will reverberate throughout a financial system whose opacity and inter-connectivity is notorious. A recent figure that was given to me confidentially, by a well-known German banker, is that a 50% haircut on EU peripheral debt would translate into an extra €850 billion of fresh capital that would need to be put into French and German banks alone to compensate them for the losses they will end up incurring.
Secondly, there is an international dimension that an export-oriented country like Germany cannot afford to ignore. For example, many of these bonds are owned by non-European banks. If they lose a lot of money, these losses can trigger another round of government infusions (in places like Japan, China, Korea, etc.), which may affect local investment in projects that would otherwise require German capital goods. What is the likely magnitude of this problem? The Bank for International Settlements tells us that the total exposure of non-EU banks to Greek, Irish, and Portuguese debt is a mere $363 billion. This is peanuts, by the standards of the 2008-11 crisis. But then again it does not take into consideration (a) the amounts owed to UK banks and (b) the more-than-likely Spanish sovereign troubles.
In view of the serious problems that a horizontal debt restructure would cause to Germany' banks and to its external trade relations, the German Ministry of Finance is therefore reluctant to come out, once and for all, in favor of a debt restructure. On the one hand, they have concluded that it is inevitable. On the other, they know it will bring huge costs to bear upon primarily Germany's own banks but also, and this is equally daunting, its export sector. The result is a new round of . . . dithering.
via mrzine.monthlyreview.org