Is there another elite in the world that could have emerged from the catastrophe it created so intact, so brazen, so self-assured as ours? If there is a secret global convention of smug fat cats, our guys must be the star inspirational speakers.
It’s not just the money. Colm Doherty’s ability to walk away from the wreckage of Allied Irish Bank with a cool €3 million is indeed exemplary. The way the heads of semi-State bodies, patriots to their fingertips, managed to increase their financial packages as the bubble burst is dazzling. The chief executive of the ESB, Pádraig McManus, who earned over €750,000 at the end of 2009 – almost €100,000 more than when the crisis hit in 2008 – must be a rock star among his peers.
Nor is it even the evasion of personal accountability, though that is outstanding. Consider the Department of Finance alone. What happened to the head of the department’s banking division, Kevin Cardiff? He was promoted to secretary general. Who is the department’s chief economic adviser? Jim O’Leary, who sat on the board of AIB between 2001 and 2008, when it was helping to destroy the country.
More dazzling than any of this, though, is the ability of the elite to control the story. Ask yourself a simple question: what kind of report into the banking fiasco would the insiders want to see? They would want, above all, two things. First: no names, no pack drill. Second: blame everyone and therefore, by implication, blame no-one in particular. Step up, Mr Nyberg. The Nyberg report does, admittedly, have some sensational revelations.
“Governance at also fell short of best practice.”
“The pressure for conformity in the banks has proven to be quite expensive.”
“There may have been a state of denial in the Central Bank”.
“Many, perhaps most, trees appear to be composed of a woodlike substance.”
“It is possible to surmise that a creature which waddles and quacks may be a duck.” (Two of these statements are not in the report.)
Beyond these generalities, nobody has to answer for anything. The excuse for this is that “during the period leadership . . . changed repeatedly in most private and public institutions discussed; this makes apportioning individual responsibility for strategic or longer-term developments impractical”.
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